

# DIAGRAMMATIC SYNTAX AND ITS CONSTRAINTS

Andrei Rodin

October 16-17, 2009

## Content:

Applications and Foundations

Categorical foundations of mathematics

Axiomatic method

Cognitive constrains of diagrammatic syntax

Conclusion

# Diagrammatic logic 1

”The industrial demand greatly energized building formal semantics for diagrammatic languages in use, and an overwhelming amount of them was proposed. The vast majority of them employ the familiar first-order (FO) or similar logical systems based on string-based formulas, and fail to do the job because of unfortunate mismatch between the logical machineries they use for formalization and the internal logics of the domains they intend to formalize.”

(Z. Diskin and U. Wolter (2009): *A diagrammatic logic for object-oriented visual modeling*)

## Diagrammatic logic 2

”Parallelism of specification and graphical visualization is provided by the graph-based nature of the sketch logic, and sharply distinguishes sketches from those visual models which are externally graphical, yet internally are based on predicate-calculus-oriented string logics. The repertoire of graphical constructs used in these models has to be bulky since all kinds of logical formulas require its special visualization. Configurations/shapes of these visualization constructs can be rather arbitrary because there are no evident natural correlations between graphics and logical string-based formulas.”

(Z. Diskin, Kadish B., F. Piessens, and M. Johnson (2000):

*Universal arrow foundations for visual modeling*)

# Philosophical relevance

# Philosophical relevance

- ▶ Classical First-order logic as \*the\* foundation of rationality in Analytic philosophy

# Philosophical relevance

- ▶ Classical First-order logic as \*the\* foundation of rationality in Analytic philosophy
- ▶ String-based syntax of Classical First-order logic, Intuitionistic logic, etc.

# Philosophical relevance

- ▶ Classical First-order logic as \*the\* foundation of rationality in Analytic philosophy
- ▶ String-based syntax of Classical First-order logic, Intuitionistic logic, etc.
- ▶ Logical form of expressions of natural language (=English)



# Philosophical relevance

- ▶ Classical First-order logic as \*the\* foundation of rationality in Analytic philosophy
- ▶ String-based syntax of Classical First-order logic, Intuitionistic logic, etc.
- ▶ Logical form of expressions of natural language (=English)
- ▶ Philosophical prejudices can be eliminated only with philosophical means

# Philosophical relevance

- ▶ Classical First-order logic as \*the\* foundation of rationality in Analytic philosophy
- ▶ String-based syntax of Classical First-order logic, Intuitionistic logic, etc.
- ▶ Logical form of expressions of natural language (=English)
- ▶ Philosophical prejudices can be eliminated only with philosophical means
- ▶ New applications require new foundations!

# Sets of sets and categories of categories

## Sets of sets and categories of categories

Lawvere 1966: *The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics* (cf. sets of sets in Foundations of Mathematics)

# Sets of sets and categories of categories

Lawvere 1966: *The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics* (cf. sets of sets in Foundations of Mathematics)

(1) Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories

# Sets of sets and categories of categories

Lawvere 1966: *The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics* (cf. sets of sets in Foundations of Mathematics)

- (1) Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories
- (2) Basic Theory of Categories

# Sets of sets and categories of categories

Lawvere 1966: *The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics* (cf. sets of sets in Foundations of Mathematics)

- (1) Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories
- (2) Basic Theory of Categories
- (3) Stronger Theory of Categories

# Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories (ETAC)

Axioms of ETAC:



# Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories (ETAC)

Axioms of ETAC:

- ▶ E1)  $\Delta_i(\Delta_j(x)) = \Delta_j(x); i, j = 0, 1$

# Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories (ETAC)

## Axioms of ETAC:

- ▶ E1)  $\Delta_i(\Delta_j(x)) = \Delta_j(x); i, j = 0, 1$
- ▶ E2)  $(\Gamma(x, y; u) \wedge \Gamma(x, y; u')) \Rightarrow u = u'$

# Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories (ETAC)

## Axioms of ETAC:

- ▶ E1)  $\Delta_i(\Delta_j(x)) = \Delta_j(x); i, j = 0, 1$
- ▶ E2)  $(\Gamma(x, y; u) \wedge \Gamma(x, y; u')) \Rightarrow u = u'$
- ▶ E3)  $\exists u \Gamma(x, y; u) \Leftrightarrow \Delta_1(x) = \Delta_0(y)$

# Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories (ETAC)

## Axioms of ETAC:

- ▶ E1)  $\Delta_i(\Delta_j(x)) = \Delta_j(x); i, j = 0, 1$
- ▶ E2)  $(\Gamma(x, y; u) \wedge \Gamma(x, y; u')) \Rightarrow u = u'$
- ▶ E3)  $\exists u \Gamma(x, y; u) \Leftrightarrow \Delta_1(x) = \Delta_0(y)$
- ▶ E4)  $\Gamma(x, y; u) \Rightarrow (\Delta_0(u) = \Delta_0(x)) \wedge (\Delta_1(u) = \Delta_1(y))$

# Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories (ETAC)

## Axioms of ETAC:

- ▶ E1)  $\Delta_i(\Delta_j(x)) = \Delta_j(x); i, j = 0, 1$
- ▶ E2)  $(\Gamma(x, y; u) \wedge \Gamma(x, y; u')) \Rightarrow u = u'$
- ▶ E3)  $\exists u \Gamma(x, y; u) \Leftrightarrow \Delta_1(x) = \Delta_0(y)$
- ▶ E4)  $\Gamma(x, y; u) \Rightarrow (\Delta_0(u) = \Delta_0(x)) \wedge (\Delta_1(u) = \Delta_1(y))$
- ▶ E5)  $\Gamma(\Delta_0(x), x; x) \wedge \Gamma(x, \Delta_1(x); x)$

# Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories (ETAC)

## Axioms of ETAC:

- ▶ E1)  $\Delta_i(\Delta_j(x)) = \Delta_j(x); i, j = 0, 1$
- ▶ E2)  $(\Gamma(x, y; u) \wedge \Gamma(x, y; u')) \Rightarrow u = u'$
- ▶ E3)  $\exists u \Gamma(x, y; u) \Leftrightarrow \Delta_1(x) = \Delta_0(y)$
- ▶ E4)  $\Gamma(x, y; u) \Rightarrow (\Delta_0(u) = \Delta_0(x)) \wedge (\Delta_1(u) = \Delta_1(y))$
- ▶ E5)  $\Gamma(\Delta_0(x), x; x) \wedge \Gamma(x, \Delta_1(x); x)$
- ▶ E6)  $(\Gamma(x, y; u) \wedge \Gamma(y, z; w) \wedge \Gamma(x, w; f) \wedge \Gamma(u, z; g)) \Rightarrow f = g$

# Elementary Theory of Abstract Categories (ETAC)

## Axioms of ETAC:

- ▶ E1)  $\Delta_i(\Delta_j(x)) = \Delta_j(x); i, j = 0, 1$
- ▶ E2)  $(\Gamma(x, y; u) \wedge \Gamma(x, y; u')) \Rightarrow u = u'$
- ▶ E3)  $\exists u \Gamma(x, y; u) \Leftrightarrow \Delta_1(x) = \Delta_0(y)$
- ▶ E4)  $\Gamma(x, y; u) \Rightarrow (\Delta_0(u) = \Delta_0(x)) \wedge (\Delta_1(u) = \Delta_1(y))$
- ▶ E5)  $\Gamma(\Delta_0(x), x; x) \wedge \Gamma(x, \Delta_1(x); x)$
- ▶ E6)  $(\Gamma(x, y; u) \wedge \Gamma(y, z; w) \wedge \Gamma(x, w; f) \wedge \Gamma(u, z; g)) \Rightarrow f = g$

1)-4): bookkeeping (syntax); 5): identity; 6): associativity

# Mayberry's objection:



## Mayberry's objection:

In order to build a model of ETAC (or any other first-order theory) one needs a primitive notion of *collection* (class, set). Similarly in the case of axiomatic set theories. Hence categorical foundations cannot be \*ultimate\* self-standing foundations.

## Mayberry's objection:

In order to build a model of ETAC (or any other first-order theory) one needs a primitive notion of *collection* (class, set). Similarly in the case of axiomatic set theories. Hence categorical foundations cannot be \*ultimate\* self-standing foundations.

Abstract categories are NOT categories of categories!

## Basic Theory (BC)

Idea:

- ▶ take an arbitrary model  $M$  of ETAC and think of  $M$  as "the" category of categories (to be further specified);

## Basic Theory (BC)

Idea:

- ▶ take an arbitrary model  $M$  of ETAC and think of  $M$  as "the" category of categories (to be further specified);
- ▶ take an arbitrary \*object\* (= identity morphism)  $A$  of  $M$  and think of  $A$  as an arbitrary category;

## Basic Theory (BC)

### Idea:

- ▶ take an arbitrary model  $M$  of ETAC and think of  $M$  as "the" category of categories (to be further specified);
- ▶ take an arbitrary \*object\* (= identity morphism)  $A$  of  $M$  and think of  $A$  as an arbitrary category;
- ▶ make  $A$  into an "internal model" of ETAC using ETAC extended with some additional Axioms and some further constructions

## Basic Theory (BC)

Idea:

- ▶ take an arbitrary model  $M$  of ETAC and think of  $M$  as "the" category of categories (to be further specified);
- ▶ take an arbitrary \*object\* (= identity morphism)  $A$  of  $M$  and think of  $A$  as an arbitrary category;
- ▶ make  $A$  into an "internal model" of ETAC using ETAC extended with some additional Axioms and some further constructions

Compare the case of internal models of ZF. A difference: BC is stronger than ETAC

# Additional Axioms and constructions in BC (simplified)

## Additional Axioms and constructions in BC (simplified)

- ▶ B1) Initial object  $0$  in  $M$



## Additional Axioms and constructions in BC (simplified)

- ▶ B1) Initial object  $0$  in  $M$
- ▶ B2) Terminal object  $1$  in  $M$

## Additional Axioms and constructions in BC (simplified)


- ▶ B1) Initial object  $0$  in  $M$
- ▶ B2) Terminal object  $1$  in  $M$
- ▶ B3) Equalizers and co-equalizers (and hence all finite limits and co-limits) in  $M$

## Additional Axioms and constructions in BC (simplified)

- ▶ B1) Initial object  $0$  in  $M$
- ▶ B2) Terminal object  $1$  in  $M$
- ▶ B3) Equalizers and co-equalizers (and hence all finite limits and co-limits) in  $M$
- ▶ B4) Object  $2$  of the form  $0 \rightarrow 1$


## Additional Axioms and constructions in BC (simplified)

- ▶ B1) Initial object 0 in  $M$
- ▶ B2) Terminal object 1 in  $M$
- ▶ B3) Equalizers and co-equalizers (and hence all finite limits and co-limits) in  $M$
- ▶ B4) Object 2 of the form  $0 \rightarrow 1$
- ▶ B5) Object 3 of the form




## Additional Axioms and constructions in BC (simplified)

- ▶ B1) Initial object 0 in  $M$
- ▶ B2) Terminal object 1 in  $M$
- ▶ B3) Equalizers and co-equalizers (and hence all finite limits and co-limits) in  $M$
- ▶ B4) Object 2 of the form  $0 \rightarrow 1$
- ▶ B5) Object 3 of the form



- ▶ B6) Object 4 of the form



(notice the path

# Interpretations in $\mathcal{A}$

## Interpretations in $A$

- ▶ I1)  $1 \rightarrow A$ : object (=identity morphism) in  $A$

## Interpretations in $A$

- ▶ I1)  $1 \rightarrow A$ : object (=identity morphism) in  $A$
- ▶ I2)  $2 \rightarrow A$ : morphism in  $A$



## Interpretations in $A$

- ▶ I1)  $1 \rightarrow A$ : object (=identity morphism) in  $A$
- ▶ I2)  $2 \rightarrow A$ : morphism in  $A$
- ▶ I3)  $3 \rightarrow A$ : composition of morphisms (= a commutative triangle) in  $A$

## Interpretations in $A$

- ▶ I1)  $1 \rightarrow A$ : object (=identity morphism) in  $A$
- ▶ I2)  $2 \rightarrow A$ : morphism in  $A$
- ▶ I3)  $3 \rightarrow A$ : composition of morphisms (= a commutative triangle) in  $A$
- ▶ I4)  $4 \rightarrow A$ : associativity (= an associative rhombus) in  $A$

# Two layers of Lawvere's categorical foundations:

## Two layers of Lawvere's categorical foundations:

(I) A first-order theory (ETAC) built by standard means

## Two layers of Lawvere's categorical foundations:

- (I) A first-order theory (ETAC) built by standard means
- (II) A theory (BC) built by non-standard \*categorical\* means

## Two layers of Lawvere's categorical foundations:

- (I) A first-order theory (ETAC) built by standard means
- (II) A theory (BC) built by non-standard \*categorical\* means

CLAIM: "Purely categorical" foundations of mathematics must be built "purely categorically"; they require a new notion of axiomatic method. The standard Hilbert-style Axiomatic method is essentially set-theoretic and hence inappropriate in categorical foundations. Remind Mayberry's objection. Categories cannot be simply replaced by sets as far as one keeps the standard notion of Axiomatic method untouched.

## Two layers of Lawvere's categorical foundations:

- (I) A first-order theory (ETAC) built by standard means
- (II) A theory (BC) built by non-standard \*categorical\* means

CLAIM: "Purely categorical" foundations of mathematics must be built "purely categorically"; they require a new notion of axiomatic method. The standard Hilbert-style Axiomatic method is essentially set-theoretic and hence inappropriate in categorical foundations. Remind Mayberry's objection. Categories cannot be simply replaced by sets as far as one keeps the standard notion of Axiomatic method untouched.

QUESTION: How to dispense with ETAC and make BT self-sustained?

# Proposal:



## Proposal:

Read "bookkeeping" axioms E1-E4 as syntactic rules

this is a \*diagrammatic syntax\*

## Proposal:

Read "bookkeeping" axioms E1-E4 as syntactic rules

this is a \*diagrammatic syntax\*

Read axioms E5, E6, B1-B3 as "laws of logic"

this is a basic categorical logic

## Proposal:

Read "bookkeeping" axioms E1-E4 as syntactic rules

this is a \*diagrammatic syntax\*

Read axioms E5, E6, B1-B3 as "laws of logic"

this is a basic categorical logic

Read axioms B4-B6 as axioms of Category theory

Notice the "foundational circularity" like in the case of axiomatic theories of sets. Mayberry's objection doesn't go through!

# Prospects:

## Prospects:

The existing version of Sketch theory relies upon set-theoretic foundations. The above proposal amounts to a synthesis of the Sketch theory with Lawvere's axiomatic approach. Axiomatic Category theory can play a role in the development of the categorical diagram-based logic similar to that played by the axiomatic Set theory in the development of the (family of) string-based logics.

## Prospects:

The existing version of Sketch theory relies upon set-theoretic foundations. The above proposal amounts to a synthesis of the Sketch theory with Lawvere's axiomatic approach. Axiomatic Category theory can play a role in the development of the categorical diagram-based logic similar to that played by the axiomatic Set theory in the development of the (family of) string-based logics.

**QUESTION:** What is the exact relation between the string-based logic and Set theory?

# Constraint 1:

## Constraint 1:

The standard notion of *\*space\** implies the reversibility of spatial motions: any trajectory can be traced back.

Hence the spatial motion cannot represent the notion of categorical functor faithfully. A category should be thought of as a *\*space-time\** rather than a mere space. This "dynamical" feature is not immediately present in diagrams.






## Constraint 2:

## Constraint 2:

Our usual geometrical intuition allows for unlimited introduction of new points. In a categorical context this intuition becomes misleading.

Two functors may coincide on all their points but still be different. A transformation doesn't reduce to a set of momentary states.



# Conclusions:

## Conclusions:

- 1) The foundational context is most appropriate for developing a diagram-based logic.

## Conclusions:

- 1) The foundational context is most appropriate for developing a diagram-based logic.
- 2) Syntax is a genuine part of mathematics. Cf. Postulates and Axioms in Euclid's *Elements*.