Towards categorical foundations of geometry: What is geometrical object?

Andrei Rodin

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Content:

Hilbertian Axiomatic Method

Lawvere on categorical foundations

Rethinking the Hilbertian Setting through the History of Geometry

A Sketch of categorical foundations of geometry

Veblen and Young, 1938, Projective geometry, vol. 1

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The starting point of any strictly logical treatment of geometry (and indeed of any branch of mathematics) must then be a set of undefined elements and relations, and a set of unproved propositions (=axioms) involving them, and from these all other propositions (theorems) are to be derived by the methods of formal logic. Moreover, since we assumed the point of view of fromal (i.e. symbolic) logic, the undefined elements are to be regarded as mere symbols devoid of content...

We understand the term a <u>mathematical science</u> to mean <u>any set of propositions</u> arranged according to a sequence of <u>logical deduction</u>. ... Such a science is purely <u>abstract</u>. If any concrete system of things may be regarded as satisfying the fundamental assumptions (=axioms), this system is a concrete <u>application</u> or <u>representation</u> (=or model) of the abstract science.

The notion of a <u>class</u> of objects is fundamental in logic and hence in any mathematical science. The object which make up the class are called the <u>elements</u> of the class. The notion of a class, moreover, and the relations of <u>belonging to a class</u> (being included in a class, being <u>element of a class</u>, etc.) are primitive notions of logic.

A set of assumptions (=axioms) is said to be <u>categorical</u> if there is essentially only one system for which the assumptions are valid, i.e. if any two such systems may be made simply isomorphic.

(end of quote)

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- ► The distinction between an "abstract" formal theory and its "concrete" models. The fundamental role of Logic.
- ► The fundamental role of the notion of a <u>class</u>. <u>Objects</u> are elements of classes.
- Structuralism: isomorphic models are essentially the same. The relation of being isomorphic plays the role of equality.

Claims:

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- Genuine <u>categorical</u> foundations cannot rely onto Hilbertian Axiomatic Method but require a different method of theory-building.
- ▶ In particular, categorical foundations require a different notion of object.
- Categorical foundations cannot be Structural foundations (leaving the issue aside).



"The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics", 1966 :

In the mathematical development of recent decades one sees clearly the rise of the conviction that the relevant properties of mathematical objects are those which can be stated in terms of their abstract structure rather than in terms of the elements which the objects were thought to be made of. The question thus naturally arises whether one can give a foundation for mathematics which expresses wholeheartedly this conviction concerning what mathematics is about, and in particular in which classes and membership in classes do not play any role.

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- (3) Stronger Theory of Categories

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- 1)-4): bookkeeping (syntax); 5): identity; 6): associativity



"The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics", 1966 :

By a category we of course understand (intuitively) any structure which is an interpretation of the elementary theory of abstract categories, and by a functor we understand (intuitively) any triple consisting of two categories and a rule T which assigns, to each morphism x of the first category, a unique morphism xT of the second category in such a way that ...

Mayberry's objection:

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In order to build a model of ETAC (or any other first-order theory) one needs a primitive notion of *collection* (class, set). Similarly in the case of axiomatic set theories. Hence categorical foundations cannot be *ultimate* self-standing foundations

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- ► This general theory split itself into parts in a rather unusual way (Unification Problem)



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- ▶ Klein in 1971 developed a general theory of spaces of constant curvature (that also included the elliptic case).
- ▶ Hilbert in 1899 proposed a novel Axiomatic Method that met certain epistemological concerns about the new geometry.



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Note: The "space of logical possibilities" is a mere metaphor

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Projective duality

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- ► Lobachevsky's *horosphere* (a surface in Lobachevskian 3-space that is a non-standard model of Euclidean 2-space, i.e. Euclidean plane)

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The notion of *intrinsic geometry* (of a geometrical object living in some space) generalises upon the above example.

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Generally an *object* is a map from a *type* to a *space* of representation.

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Geometrical spaces (or more precisely *units* live in a space of *maps* between such things, i.e. in a *category of geometrical objects*. The term *objects* as it is usually used in the Category theory is a misname! It reflects the old Hilbertian way of thinking about categories.

An alternative account of the Multiple Representation Phenomenon:

Different types are differently "represented" in different spaces. A given type qua type is described in terms of such different "images" (outgoing maps); qua space is described in terms of it "contents", i.e. in terms of incoming maps. No need for an "abstract structure". There is a duality between the "content" and the "representation": a given unit has multiple "contents" as well as multiple "representations". The former feature is well known since Euclid's times; the latter feature was discovered only in 19th century when the notion of absolute space was given up.

What replacement for Hilbert's Axiomatic Method?

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but here is a sketch...

A Sketch of categorical foundations of geometry

to be elaborated with Sketch theory (but without using any "base" category like that of sets!)

