All Objects are Arrows, All Arrows are Objects

Andrei Rodin

16 ноября 2013 г.
Formal and Genetic Axiomatic Methods

Theory of Objects

Case studies

  Topos theory
  Homotopy Type theory

Conclusions
The term axiomatic will be used partly in a broader and partly in a narrower sense. We will call the development of a theory axiomatic in the broadest sense if the basic notions and presuppositions are stated first, and then the further content of the theory is logically derived with the help of definitions and proofs. In this sense, Euclid provided an axiomatic grounding for geometry, Newton for mechanics, and Clausius for thermodynamics.
[F]or axiomatics in the narrowest sense, the *existential form* comes in as an additional factor. This marks the difference between the *axiomatic method* and the *constructive* or *genetic* method of grounding a theory. While the constructive method *introduces the objects* of a theory [..], an axiomatic theory [in the narrow sense of “axiomatic”] refers to a *fixed* system of things (or several such systems) [i.e. to one or several models].[..] This is an idealizing assumption that properly augments the assumptions formulated in the axioms.
When we now approach the task of such an impossibility proof [= proof of consistency], we have to be aware of the fact that we cannot again execute this proof with the method of axiomatic-existential inference. Rather, we may only apply modes of inference that are free from idealizing existence assumptions.
Yet, as a result of this deliberation, the following idea suggests itself right away: If we can conduct the impossibility proof without making any axiomatic-existential assumptions, should it then not be possible to provide a grounding for the whole of arithmetic directly in this way, whereby that impossibility proof would become entirely superfluous?
Hilbert’s answer is in negative because of his worries about infinity.
Formulae-building, formal inferences. Genetic aspect is wholly syntactic. Formulae are objects of a meta-theory, not of the object-theory. A distinctive feature of FAM: limiting the constructive aspect of the method to syntax (in order to save infinities in semantics).
(1) FAM does not apply straightforwardly in the mainstream 20th c. maths. It serves for providing definitions rather than proofs. Example: Group theory is a model theory of the axiomatic group theory, i.e., the theory determined by the three group axioms. Where models come from?
(2) The impact of FAM on Set theory is unclear. Example: The Independence of CH from ZF is well-established mathematical fact; the proof of this theorem (Gödel-Cohen) is not a formal axiomatic proof - notwithstanding the fact that this theorem treats a formal theory, namely ZF as its object (its subject-matter). This Independence result neither proves nor refutes CH. It does not allow to rule out CH as ill-posed either (after the example of Euclid’s 5th Postulate). The full-scale relativism about mathematical statements is not consistent with the claim that the Independence of CH from ZF is well-established.
Some reasons to be dissatisfied with FAM

(3) The usual distinction between a theory and corresponding meta-theory doesn’t make sense in the mathematical practice.
Some reasons to be dissatisfied with FAM

(4) The 20th c. showed no significant progress in the axiomatization of physics (Hilbert’s 6th Problem). During this century FAM played no role at all in the mainstream research in physics and other natural sciences. This one, in my view, is the strongest reason (however in my book I don’t focus on it).
New-Old Genetic Axiomatic Method

Categorical logic and its geometrical interpretations bring us back to Euclid, Newton and Clausius.
New-Old Genetic Axiomatic Method

Genetic Axiomatic Method is Object-Oriented Axiomatics Method. Compare the turn from Functional Programming to Object-Oriented Programming. The latter comprises the former (?) but is richer.
Claim

Renewal of Genetic Method is an essential part of Categorical logic in its historical development since late 1960ies. (See the case studies below.)
The idea of intrinsic geometry (Gauss-Riemann-Klein)
Objects are maps

General situation:

\[ \text{TYPE} \xrightarrow{\text{object}} \text{SPACE} \]

Remarks:
Being a type and being a space are relational properties. Being an object is non-relational property. Each object is of particular type and lives in a particular space.
Classical examples:

\[
EPLANE \xrightarrow{\text{eplane}} ESPACE
\]

\[
CIRCLE \xrightarrow{\text{circle}_1} EPLANE
\]

\[
\downarrow \quad \downarrow
\]

\[
\text{circle}_2
\]

\[
\xleftarrow{\text{eplane}} \quad \xleftarrow{\text{eplane}}
\]

\[
ESPACE
\]
Non-classical examples (19th century):

\[ HPLANE \xrightarrow{\text{pseudosphere}} ESPACE \]
(Beltramy)

\[ EPLANE \xrightarrow{\text{horisphere}} HSPACE \]
(Lobachevsky)

Remark: Pseudosphere and horisphere are not types/spaces but objects.
Objects are maps

Objects of the same type look differently in different spaces:

- $HSPACE$
- $EPLANE$
- $ESPACE$

Objects of different types in the same space look always differently.
When it was understood that there is no unique representation space for all objects a popular reaction was to disregard the epistemic role of representation altogether and reduce objects to abstract individuals (possibly belonging to certain types). The true lesson of the 19th century geometry is the relativity of representation but not its epistemic insignificance.

Different geometrical spaces are unified into a single whole through mutual mappings, i.e., through their shared objects. Objects link different spaces. This provides a geometrical unification of the 19th century geometry (as distinguished from its purely logical unification).
Remarks

(Historical) When it was understood that there is no unique representation space for all objects a popular reaction was to disregard the epistemic role of representation altogether and reduce objects to abstract individuals (possibly belonging to certain types). The true lesson of the 19th century geometry is the relativity of representation but not its epistemic insignificance.
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Role of Categories

Objects (as maps) typically form categories; sufficiently rich categories allow for internal logic (which reflects its object-building procedures); the internal logic of a given category is used for the axiomatic building of this very category; thus Category theory (including Categorical logic) serves as a tool of renewed Genetic (object-oriented) Axiomatic Method.
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Compare the conceptual shift from Gauss’ theory of curve surfaces to Riemann’s general theory of (differentiable) manifolds: intrinsic construction of manifolds; no fixed ambient space is needed.
Analogy with geometry

Epistemically intrinsic and extrinsic properties of a given manifold are to be treated on equal footing. In the language of arrows the *intrinsic* properties are expressed by *incoming* morphisms while the extrinsic properties are expressed by *outgoing* morphisms (in particular, by embeddings into outer spaces). A given type/space is characterized by morphisms of both sorts.
However there is a sense in which any given space can be fully characterized intrinsically. In that sense the Euclidean Planimetry fully describes EPLANE as a space. Extrinsic properties of EPLANE reveal themselves when the EPLANE embeds into ESPACE, HSPACE, etc.

Traditional essentialism requires to fix intrinsic properties first and study extrinsic (relational) properties afterwards. I do not endorse this view.
Lawvere’s axiomatization of Topos theory and Voevodsky’s axiomatization of Higher Homotopy apply NAM rather than FAM.
The structure behind the Curry-Howard isomorphism is precisely captured by the notion of *Cartesian closed category* (CCC), which is an (abstract) category with the terminal object, products and exponentials.
Foundational consideration played a crucial role throughout the history of the subject (Schoenfinkel, Curry, Church, Kolmogorov, Lawvere, Lambek). The expression “Curry-Howard isomorphism”, which suggests that we have here an unexplained/surprising formal coincidence, is due to Howard 1969. The true history (and the true meaning) still waits to be explored.
Lawvere’s philosophical motivation
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- objective invariant structures vs. its subjective syntactical presentations
Lawvere’s philosophical motivation

- objective invariant structures vs. its subjective syntactical presentations
- objective logic vs. subjective logic (Hegel)
Internalization of Logic via Axiomatization of Set theory
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- 1964: Elementary Theory of Category of Sets (ETCS)
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- 1964: Elementary Theory of Category of Sets (ETCS)
- 1969: Cartesian Closed Categories (CCC)
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- 1970: Toposes
The unity of opposites in the title is essentially that between logic and geometry, and there are compelling reasons for maintaining that geometry is the leading aspect. At the same time, in the present joint work with Myles Tierney there are important influences in the other direction: a Grothendieck “topology” appears most naturally as a modal operator, of the nature “it is locally the case that”, the usual logical operators, such as $\forall$, $\exists$, $\Rightarrow$ have natural analogues which apply to families of geometrical objects rather than to propositional functions, and an important technique is to lift constructions first understood for “the” category $S$ of abstract sets to an arbitrary topos.
We first sum up the principle contradictions of the Grothendieck-Giraud-Verdier theory of topos in terms of four or five adjoint functors [...] enabling one to claim that in a sense logic is a special case of geometry. (Lawvere 1970)
Lawvere’s axioms for topos

(Elementary) topos is a category which
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- has finite limits
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(Elementary) topos is a category which

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- is CCC
Lawvere’s axioms for topos

( Elementary) topos is a category which

- has finite limits
- is CCC
- has a subobject classifier
Claim:

Lawvere’s axiomatic theory of (elementary toposes) is not built by FAM. Instead of rebuilding topos theory with a pre-established logical framework Lawvere reveals the logical aspect of toposes. This move brings about a (genetic) axiomatic theory!
Pre-history:

For deductions over $X$, one may take provable entailments [...] or one may take suitable “homotopy classes” of deductions in the usual sense. One can write down an inductive definition of the “homotopy” relation, but the author does not understand well what results. (Lawvere: *Equality in hyperdoctrines* 1970)
MLTT (Martin-Löf 1980): key features

- double interpretation of types: "sets" and propositions
- double interpretation of terms: elements of sets and proofs of propositions
- higher orders: dependent types (sums and products of families of sets)
- higher identity types (in non-extensional versions)
- MLTT is the internal language of LCCC (Seely 1983)
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Groupoid model of MLTT: basic types are groupoids, terms are their elements, dependent types are fibrations of groupoids (families of groupoids indexed by groupoids - rather than families of sets indexed by sets). Extensionality one dimension up. (Streicher 1993).

Higher (homotopical) groupoids model higher identity types. Intensionality all way up (Voevodsky circa 2008).
The broad motivation behind univalent foundations is a desire to have a system in which mathematics can be formalized in a manner which is as natural as possible. Whilst it is possible to encode all of mathematics into Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the manner in which this is done is frequently ugly; worse, when one does so, there remain many statements of ZF which are mathematically meaningless.
Univalent foundations seeks to improve on this situation by providing a system, based on Martin-Löf’s dependent type theory whose syntax is tightly wedded to the intended semantical interpretation in the world of everyday mathematics. In particular, it allows the direct formalization of the world of homotopy types; indeed, these are the basic entities dealt with by the system. (Voevodsky 2011)
(i) Given space is called a *contractible* (aka space of $h$-level 0) when there is point $x : A$ connected by a path with each point $y : A$ in such a way that all these paths are homotopic.

(ii) We say that $A$ is a space of $h$-level $n + 1$ if for all its points $x, y$ path spaces $\text{paths}_A(x, y)$ are of $h$-level $n$. 
$h$-universe
Level 0: up to homotopy equivalence there is just one contractible space that we call “point” and denote $pt$;
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Level 1: up to homotopy equivalence there are two spaces here: the empty space $\emptyset$ and the point $pt$. (For $\emptyset$ condition (ii) is satisfied vacuously; for $pt$ (ii) is satisfied because in $pt$ there exists only one path, which consists of this very point.) We call $\emptyset$, $pt$ truth values; we also refer to types of this level as properties and propositions. Notice that $h$-level $n$ corresponds to the logical level $n - 1$: the propositional logic (i.e., the propositional segment of our type theory) lives at $h$-level 1.
$h$-universe

...
Level 2: Types of this level are characterized by the following property: their path spaces are either empty or contractible. So such types are disjoint unions of contractible components (points), or in other words sets of points. This will be our working notion of set available in this framework.


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- Level 3: Types of this level are characterized by the following property: their path spaces are sets (up to homotopy equivalence). These are obviously (ordinary flat) *groupoids* (with path spaces hom-sets).
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Level 4: 2-groupoids
$h$-universe

- ..
- Level $n+2$: $n$-groupoids
- ..
- $\omega$-groupoids
- $\omega$-groupoids ($\omega + 1 = \omega$)
Possible application: physical object-building

Identity through time.

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Possible application: physical object-building

Gravitational lensing
Possible application: physical object-building

Wormhole lensing
Conclusions

The New Axiomatic Method is the Good Old Genetic Axiomatic Method of Euclid, Newton and Clausius. However it constructs theoretical objects in a novel way.

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However it constructs theoretical objects in a novel way.
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Axiomatic Method and Category Theory

Series: Synthese Library, Vol. 364

- Offers readers a coherent look at the past, present and anticipated future of the Axiomatic Method
- Provides a deep textual analysis of Euclid, Hilbert, and Lawvere that describes how their ideas are different and how their ideas progressed over time
- Presents a hypothetical New Axiomatic Method, which establishes closer relationships between mathematics and physics

This volume explores the many different meanings of the notion of the axiomatic method, offering an insightful historical and philosophical discussion about how these notions changed over the millennia.

The author, a well-known philosopher and historian of mathematics, first examines Euclid, who is considered the father of the axiomatic method, before moving onto Hilbert and Lawvere. He then presents a deep textual analysis of each writer and describes how their ideas are different and even how their ideas progressed over time. Next, the book explores category theory and details how it has revolutionized the notion of the axiomatic method. It considers the question of identity/equality in mathematics as well as examines the
Contents

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1

Part I A Brief History of the Axiomatic Method

2 Euclid: Doing and Showing .................................................................................................................. 15
   2.1 Demonstration and “Monstration” ................................................................................................. 16
   2.2 Are Euclid’s Proofs Logical? ......................................................................................................... 19
   2.3 Instantiation, Objecthood and Objectivity ..................................................................................... 23
   2.4 Proto-Logical Deduction and Geometrical Production ............................................................... 27
   2.5 Euclid and Modern Mathematics ................................................................................................. 35

3 Hilbert: Making It Formal .................................................................................................................... 39
   3.1 Foundations of 1899: Logical Form and Mathematical Intuition ................................................. 40
   3.2 Foundations of 1899: Logicality and Logicism ............................................................................. 47
   3.3 Axiomatization of Logic: Logical Form Versus Symbolic Form ................................................. 54
   3.4 Foundations of 1927: Intuition Strikes Back .................................................................................. 60
   3.5 Symbolic Logic and Diagrammatic Logic ..................................................................................... 64
   3.6 Foundations of 1934–1939: Doing Is Showing? .......................................................................... 68

4 Formal Axiomatic Method and the Twentieth Century Mathematics .................................................. 73
   4.1 Set Theory ...................................................................................................................................... 74
   4.2 Bourbaki ....................................................................................................................................... 78
   4.3 Galilean Science and Set-Theoretic Foundations of Mathematics .............................................. 87
   4.4 Towards the New Axiomatic Method: Interpreting Logic ........................................................... 93

5 Lawvere: Pursuit of Objectivity .......................................................................................................... 99
   5.1 Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets ................................................................................... 104
   5.2 Category of Categories as a Foundation ....................................................................................... 105
   5.3 Conceptual Theories and Their Presentations .............................................................................. 110
   5.4 Curry-Howard Correspondence and Cartesian Closed Categories .......................................... 118
   5.5 Hyperdoctrines ............................................................................................................................. 122
   5.6 Functorial Semantics .................................................................................................................... 125

Andrei Rodin

All Objects are Arrows, All Arrows are Objects
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.7 Formal and Conceptual .............................................. 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8 Categorical Logic and Hegelian Dialectics .............................. 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9 Toposes and Their Internal Logic ................................... 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II Identity and Categorification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Identity in Classical and Constructive Mathematics ................. 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Paradoxes of Identity and Mathematical Doubles ........................ 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Types and Tokens .......................................................... 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Frege and Russell on the Identity of Natural Numbers .................... 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Plato .............................................................................. 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Definitions by Abstraction ................................................ 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6 Relative Identity ............................................................ 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7 Internal Relations .......................................................... 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8 Classes ............................................................................. 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9 Individuals .......................................................................... 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10 Extension and Intension ..................................................... 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.11 Identity in the Intuitionistic Type Theory ................................ 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Identity Through Change, Category Theory and Homotopy Theory .... 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Relations Versus Transformations ......................................... 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 How to Think Circle ............................................................ 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Categorification ................................................................. 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Are Identity Morphisms Logical? ........................................... 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Fibred Categories .............................................................. 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6 Higher Categories ................................................................... 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7 Homotopies ........................................................................... 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8 Model Categories .................................................................... 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.9 Homotopy Type Theory ....................................................... 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.10 Univalent Foundations ....................................................... 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part III Subjective Intuitions and Objective Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 How Mathematical Concepts Get Their Bodies ................................. 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Changing Intuition ............................................................... 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Form and Motion ................................................................. 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Non-Euclidean Intuition ........................................................ 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 Lost Ideals ............................................................................. 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5 Are Intuitions Fundamental? .................................................. 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Categories Versus Structures ..................................................... 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 Structuralism, Mathematical .................................................. 236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 What Replaces What? ............................................................ 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3 Erlangen Program and Axiomatic Method .................................. 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4 Objective Structures ............................................................ 246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Andrei Rodin

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http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.1478
THANK YOU!